Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining by Yoo, John
Cornell Law Review
Volume 97
Issue 1 November 2011 Article 1
Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-
Executive Agreements, and International
Bargaining
John Yoo
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2011)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol97/iss1/1





I. THE STRUGGLE OVER INSTRUMENTS ...................... 4
II. TREATIES AS THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRISES . 11
A. Conflict as Bargaining Failure ...................... 14
B. Incomplete Information and Settlement ............ 17
C. Conflict as a Commitment Problem ................. 21
III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION .......................................... 23
A. Choice of Instruments as Informational Signals ..... 25
B. Choice of Instruments and Commitment ........... 31
C ONCLUSION ................................................... 43
INTRODUCTION
In April 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian Presi-
dent Dmitry Medvedev signed a new arms-control agreement.' "New
START" will cut the strategic nuclear arms stockpiles of the two na-
tions by 30%, limit the number of weapon launchers, and link the
development of offensive and defensive missile systems. 2 President
Obama was required to submit the agreement, the first arms-reduc-
tion pact between the two countries since the Moscow Treaty of 2002,3
to the Senate for its approval before he could ratify it. As the treaty
moved through the Senate in the summer of 2010, the Obama admin-
istration could count on fifty-nine votes from its own party but was
unsure whether it could reach the two-thirds required by Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution for advice and consent.
t Professor of Law, Berkeley Law School, University of California at Berkeley; Visiting
Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. I am grateful for comments received at a 2010
conference on rational choice theory and constitutional design held at the University of
Chicago Law School. I thank Matthew DalSanto, James Phillips, and Claire Thompson for
their excellent research assistance.
1 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREAry Doc. No. 111-5.
2 Id. at pmbl., art. II.
3 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, U.S.-Russ., May 24, 2002, S. TIEATny Doc.
No. 107-8.
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But according to many commentators and the apparent scholarly
consensus, President Obama could have chosen an easier route to ap-
proval. Past Presidents have bypassed the advice-and-consent process
of the Treaty Clause and sent some international agreements to both
houses of Congress for approval as simple statutes, known as congres-
sional-executive agreements. According to the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law, " [t] he prevailing view is that the Congressional-
Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty
method in every instance." 4 In his classic work, Foreign Affairs and the
United States Constitution, Louis Henkin observed that "it is now widely
accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is available for
wide use, even general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty."5
These opinions attempt to catch up to, rather than radically
change, constitutional practice. Congressional-executive agreements
have become a vital tool of American foreign policy and have sur-
passed treaties in terms of frequency. After World War II, the United
States entered a period of rapid agreement making, entering into as
many as 450 agreements per year as compared with the less than fifty
per year before World War 11.6 According to the Congressional Re-
search Service, nontreaties are responsible. Congressional-executive
agreements, for example, accounted for 88.3% of all international
agreements between 1946 and 1972. 7 From 1939 to 1989, the nation
entered into 11,698 nontreaty international agreements and only 702
Article II treaties.8 Oona Hathaway reports that from 1980 to 2000
the United States made 2744 congressional-executive agreements and
only 375 treaties. 9 Congressional-executive agreements not only are
numerous, but also bear on subjects of great importance to the Ameri-
can national interest. The North American Free Trade Agreement 10
(NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, t
the two most recent prominent examples, regulate roughly one-quar-
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 303 cmt. e (1987).
5 Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 217 (2d ed.
1996) (footnote omitted).
6 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 39 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter
TREATIES].
7 R. ROGER MAJAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES 22 (Comm. Print 1977).
8 TREATIES, supra note 6.
9 Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Law-
making in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1258-60 (2008).
10 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
11 E.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
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ter of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) related to imports or
exports. 12
Constitutional law, however, has struggled to find a place for non-
treaty treaties. Ever since their accelerated use began, congressional-
executive agreements have encountered serious challenges to their le-
gitimacy. The constitutional text explicitly provides only one way for
the federal government to reach international agreements: the Presi-
dent negotiates the agreement, two-thirds of the Senate gives its ad-
vice and consent, and the President ratifies.' 3 Critics of modern
practice make the simple and straightforward claim that Article II's
Treaty Clause remains exclusive.14 Defenders of congressional-execu-
tive agreements have engaged in linguistic acrobatics to avoid this re-
sult, claiming that "constitutional moments" have silently amended
the Constitution, or looked to simple majoritarianism for support.15
Others have attempted to find boundaries between treaties and con-
gressional-executive agreements rooted in the constitutional structure
that preserve a place for both. 16 The Supreme Court has never taken
up the legality of congressional-executive agreements, though the
lower courts have never rejected them.
This Article takes a different approach, one focused on function
rather than legitimacy. It examines the instrumental value of the vari-
ous forms of international agreement under the Constitution. It asks
what advantages and disadvantages flow from the choice between con-
gressional-executive agreements and treaties. It suggests that the ap-
proval and ratification processes of both types of agreements produce
information that addresses bargaining difficulties produced by asym-
metry. Treaties, for example, provide more credible information ex
ante because of the greater political capital required for their
approval.
A sharp difference between treaties and congressional-executive
agreements lies in enforcement. The two types of international agree-
ments provide different ways of addressing the absence of an interna-
tional institution capable of compelling the parties to obey the
agreement or awarding damages for violations. Treaties, for example,
provide more ex ante signals of commitment because more political
12 See National Income and Product Accounts Table: Table 1.8.6. Command-Basis Real Gross
Domestic Product and Gross National Product, Chained Dollars, BuREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, http://
bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=46&FirstYear=2002&LastYear=
2004&Freq=Qtr (last updated Sept. 29, 2011) (reporting U.S. GDP of $12.410 trillion, im-
ports of $1.979 trillion, and exports of $1.252 trillion for the fourth quarter of 2004).
13 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur").
14 See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
16 See infta notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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capital is required to obtain two-thirds of the Senate to agree than
majorities of each House. Congressional-executive agreements, on
the other hand, provide stronger ex post guarantees because of the
difficulty in terminating a statute. The latter may lead to more stable,
longer-term cooperation than the former, contrary to the initial intui-
tion based on the voting requirements.
Treaties and congressional-executive agreements, therefore, have
different trade-offs that make one or the other better suited for differ-
ent types of pacts. Treaties convey more credible information about
the expected value of a good or territory, but less of a signal of ex post
commitment. Congressional-executive agreements strike the opposite
balance: less information, but greater commitment. An instrumental
approach does not find the nonexclusivity of the Treaty Clause to be a
constitutional defect. In fact, understanding the Constitution in this
light sees value in having the different options for making interna-
tional agreements. It allows the United States to send different
amounts of information and signals of commitment to other nations
depending on its own intentions and the specific context of the agree-
ment. It would be a mistake, for instrumental reasons, to limit the
federal government only to treaties or to congressional-executive
agreements solely because of concerns over interpretive methodology
or notions of democratic legitimacy.
Part I of this Article begins the analysis by describing the existing
scholarly literature on the question of "interchangeability"-in other
words the use of treaties or statutes to make international agreements.
Part II introduces a rational choice model for the resolution of inter-
national disputes, which understands international agreements as a
means to avoid wasteful conflict, but beset by informational asymme-
try and commitment problems. Part III applies this model to the
question of interchangeability, and shows the effect of the treaty-ver-
sus-statute choice on obstacles to settling disagreements between
states. It ends by comparing arms-control and international trade
agreements to illustrate the trade-offs between treaties and congres-
sional-executive agreements.
I
THE STRUGGLE OVER INSTRUMENTS
International agreements present one of the great tensions be-
tween practice and the constitutional text and structure. Congres-
sional-executive agreements have become an important tool of
American foreign relations, but their legitimacy has remained consist-
ently in doubt since their first consistent use in the New Deal period.
Their main defect is the absence of any explicit authorization in the
constitutional text for any form of international agreement other than
[Vol. 97:1
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a treaty, made by the President with the advice and consent of two-
thirds of the Senate. 17 It is difficult to maintain that the President and
mere majorities of the House and Senate can use Article I of the Con-
stitution for the exact same formal act described in Article II. This has
led to ever weaker justifications for replacing Article II treaties with
Article I statutes.
Debate over the interchangeability of instruments has focused on
its legitimacy. Nontreaty international agreements appeared as early
as 1792, when Congress authorized the Postmaster General to reach
mail-exchange agreements with other countries.18 Despite this early
precedent, congressional-executive agreements remained rare for
much of the nation's history. From 1789 to 1839, for example, the
nation entered into sixty treaties and only twenty-seven other interna-
tional agreements.19 From 1839 to 1889, the numbers remained simi-
larly low for both forms of agreements. 20 In fact, the number of
treaties made has kept fairly stable throughout the nation's history,
with a slight uptick in the period after World War II and rising close to
fifty treaties only in a single year in the late 1990s. 2 1 Congressional-
executive agreements, however, surged: from no more than two dozen
per year in the late 1930s to more than 150 per year in the 1940s,
peaks of 300 per year in the 1950s, and topping out at 400 per year by
the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a decline to between 200 to 300 per
year in the 1990s. 22 Presently, congressional-executive agreements
number about an order of magnitude greater than treaties per year.23
Criticism and defense of this practice followed. One of the first
critics was Edwin Borchard, who argued in 1944 that the Constitution
set out only one method for making international agreements in Arti-
cle II of the Constitution. 24 Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution
states that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur."25 Borchard was right-at least with regard
to the federal government. The Constitution does not describe any
other way for the President or Congress to make agreements with
other nations. Article I, Section 8, which lists Congress's powers, de-
17 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
18 See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239.
19 See TREATIES, supra note 6.





24 See Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE LJ. 616, 616
(1945). For an article that agrees with Borchard, see Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monop-
oly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1, 33-48 (1972).
25 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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scribes the subject matters for regulation, but not their form.26 Article
VI describes the Supremacy Clause effects of treaties, while Article III
includes them among the cases or controversies subject to federal-
court jurisdiction, but neither mentions other international agree-
ments. 27 Borchard made a straightforward exclusio unius argument:
the inclusion of treaties alone implied the exclusion of all other forms
of international agreement.
Borchard's argument for treaty exclusivity met with criticism from
Myres McDougal and Asher Lans. Other scholars, such as Wallace Mc-
Clure, Edward Corwin, and Quincy Wright had noted the rise of con-
gressional-executive agreements and supported the easier path toward
international cooperation that they presented. 28 But they had not
launched a sustained defense of the legitimacy of congressional-exec-
utive agreements based on the constitutional text and structure. Mc-
Dougal and Lans filled that omission. They properly observed that
the Constitution showed knowledge of more than just treaties.29 Arti-
cle I, Section 10, for example, declares: "No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress .... enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign Power."30 The Constitution distin-
guished between the treaty and these other forms of cooperation, and
was clear when it wanted to prohibit the latter. Therefore, McDougal
and Lans reasoned, the Constitution did not deprive the federal gov-
ernment of the power to make "agreements" or "compacts," which
might also find support in the Necessary and Proper Clause as an im-
plementation of a free-standing congressional power. These agree-
ments, they argued, could take the form of statutes or even unilateral
presidential orders.31
Later supporters of congressional-executive agreements went be-
yond McDougal and Lans's textual arguments to register instrumental
advantages for the Article I path. Giving the Senate an outsized role
in the making of international agreements no longer made sense, as
the sectional concerns present at the time of the Framing had disap-
26 See id. at art. I, § 8.
27 See id. at art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."); id. at art. III, § 2,
cl. 1 (providing that jurisdiction of federal courts may include treaties).
28 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944); WAL-
LACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1941); Quincy Wright, The United States and
International Agreements, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1944).
29 See Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presiden-
tial Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. I & 2), 54 YALE LJ. 181, 534,
535 (1945).
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
31 McDougal & Lans, supra note 29, at 203-06.
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peared.3 2 The growth in the Senate's size reduced its ability to act
with secrecy and speed, as the Framers had hoped, and the Senate
never became the equal partner in foreign affairs that some had pre-
dicted.33 Allowing one-third of the states to block international agree-
ments allowed a minority to pursue an isolationist foreign policy, with
sometimes disastrous results (as with the failure to join the League of
Nations). 34 Congressional-executive agreements would advance a
more democratic form of foreign policymaking that would better
serve the national interest. "One way of rendering treaty making
more democratic without constitutional amendment," Louis Henkin
wrote, "might be to have agreements made by the President if author-
ized or approved by both houses of Congress. '35 This would serve
"the cause of greater democracy. "36
There matters stood until consideration of the NAIFTA and WTO
agreements. Laurence Tribe revived the Borchard position to attack
the constitutionality of the Article I path for international agreements,
based on a more nuanced reading of the constitutional text and struc-
ture.37 Tribe argued that the constitutional text and structure do not
permit the invention of an alternative form of treaty making. Drawing
from Supreme Court decisions such as INS v. Chadha (striking down
the legislative veto) 38 and New York v. United States (prohibiting the
commandeering of state legislatures) 39 Tribe argued that the Neces-
32 See generally JACK N. RAIOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAK-
ING OF THE CONSTITUTION 69-79 (1996) (detailing sectional concerns present at the
Framing).
33 John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and
Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 851, 889, 894-95 (2001) (book review) ('Yet another
result of this structure is Congress's freedom to frustrate presidential foreign policy and
treaty initiatives through legislation and appropriations. If the Executive were to use its
powers over treaty interpretation to change foreign policy, that would not be the end of
the matter. Like the British Parliament, the Senate and House could use their legislation
and funding powers to oppose a new treaty reinterpretation. Political struggle by the polit-
ical branches, using their plenary constitutional powers, is not itself unconstitutional; on
the contrary, it is the way the Framers designed the system to work."); James Wilson,
Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337, 341 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare
J. Saladino eds., 1981) (remarking that with respect to treaties, "in its executive character,
[the Senate] can accomplish no object, without the concurrence of the [Piresident"); see
also RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 255 ("Those who blamed the erratic quality of the American
war effort on Congress, or recalled its difficulties in framing terms of peace, similarly won-
dered whether matters of war and peace were best decided by collective debates.").
34 John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agree-
ments, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 776 (2001).
35 Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 60 (1990).
36 Id.
37 See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1249-78 (1995).
38 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
39 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
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sary and Proper Clause could not make up for a lacuna in the text.40
He further compared the Treaty Clause to the adjacent Appointments
Clause to show that Article II clearly provides for alternate forms of
government action when the Framers wanted them.41 Lastly, Tribe
claimed that the Article I method conceivably allowed Congress to
enter the nation into an international agreement over a presidential
veto, a result forbidden by Article II's vesting of the final power to
make a treaty with the executive. 42 Tribe concluded that adoption of
the NAFTA and WTO agreements as statutes violated the
Constitution.43
Bruce Ackerman and David Golove came to Article I's defense.
They portrayed the use of congressional-executive agreements as a
nontextual amendment to the Constitution.44 For them, the very fact
that the constitutional text lacks an alternative form for treaty making
shows that practice has changed the Constitution's meaning.45 They
argued that as the end of World War II neared, a popular movement
to increase the United States' participation in international institu-
tions led to an attack on the Senate's antidemocratic check on treaty
making.46 The transformative 1944 presidential election validated
Roosevelt's plans to replace the supermajority requirement for trea-
ties with a majoritarian process and became part of the New Deal's
broader transfer of power from the states to the federal government.47
Adoption of the United Nations Charter as a treaty, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and World Bank agreements through Article I,
led to a new constitutional settlement enshrining interchangeability as
part of a living Constitution. 48
Other scholars have attempted to find a middle ground that pre-
serves both treaties and congressional-executive agreements. I argued
elsewhere that the Constitution reserves Article II treaties for signifi-
cant military and political agreements because they involve the coordi-
nation of the President's executive powers in foreign affairs with
legislative action.49 Under this view, congressional-executive agree-
ments remain appropriate for pacts involving international commer-
cial and financial affairs, where Article I, Section 8 gives Congress
40 See Tribe, supra note 37, at 1258-61.
41 See id. at 1272-75.
42 See id. at 1252-57.
43 See id. at 1267 n.156.
44 See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REv.
799, 883-96 (1995).
45 See id. at 805.
46 See id. at 861-65.
47 See id. at 883-89.
48 See id. at 890-96.
49 See Yoo, supra note 34, at 798-813.
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control. 50 On the other hand, matters resting outside Article I, Sec-
tion 8 would still require international regulation by treaty. 51 Peter
Spiro sought a dividing line between treaties and congressional-execu-
tive agreements in practice, which he argued could dictate constitu-
tional meaning in the same way that judicial opinions might.52
More recently, Oona Hathaway and Rosalind Dixon, separately,
have extended the transformative approach. Hathaway argues that no
subject-matter distinctions remain between treaties and congressional-
executive agreements. 53 Hathaway's empirical data show that congres-
sional-executive agreements have been used for every subject on
which international agreements have been made. 54 Eliminating trea-
ties and relying only on congressional-executive agreements would
provide for a more democratic form of lawmaking, reject the obsolete
concerns that originally gave the Senate such an outsized role in treaty
making, and produce more reliable American commitments. 55 Al-
though Dixon disagrees with Ackerman's theory of constitutional
change, she argues that the Treaty Clause creates high constitutional
error costs because changes in population have made it even harder
to ratify a treaty than the Framers intended.56 In interchangeability,
Dixon writes, "Congress has in fact succeeded in using ordinary legis-
lative means to update constitutional meaning (i.e., the supermajority
voting rule found in Article II).'57 For Ackerman and Golove,
Hathaway, and Dixon, President Woodrow Wilson could have resub-
mitted the Treaty of Versailles, after its rejection by the Senate in 1919
by one vote, for approval by a simple majority of both houses of
Congress.
These scholarly accounts suffer from various flaws. The exclusiv-
ity position of Borchard and Tribe, for example, cannot account for
the long historical pedigree of congressional-executive agreements or
the huge burst in their use in the last seventy years. It gives no recog-
nition to Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers, leading to an overly
broad reading of the scope of the Treaty Clause. McDougal and
Lans's claim infers too much from the negative restrictions on the
states. When Article I, Section 10 denied a power to the states, but the
Framers wanted to give the federal government that same power, they
did not leave it to a negative inference-they vested Congress with the
50 Id. at 764.
51 Id.
52 See PeterJ. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L.
REv. 961, 1009-34 (2001).
53 See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1239.
54 See id.
55 Id. at 1307-38.
56 See Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 Sup. CT. REv. 319, 328-30.
57 Id. at 331.
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authority explicitly. Thus, Article I, Section 10 prohibits states from
granting letters of marque and reprisal, while Article I, Section 8
grants that power to the states. 58
McDougal and Lans's successors suffer from even more serious
problems. Ackerman and Golove's account has the same faults that
afflict Ackerman's general theory of constitutional change outside of
the Article V amending process. Even worse, Ackerman and Golove's
claim that 1944 represented a "constitutional moment" for inter-
changeability is unpersuasive even within Ackerman's theory of
nontextual constitutional change. The political history of the period
reflects little popular concern in the 1944 elections over the constitu-
tional methods of making international agreements. 59 Henkin's and
Hathaway's separate claims for greater democracy in treaty making en-
counter the same problems as the original defenses of McClure,
Corwin, and Wright. If the Constitution should be purged of all
"nondemocratic" impurities, then the Senate, the Electoral College,
judicial review, and even aspects of the House of Representatives are
equally as repugnant as treaties. Favoring simple majoritarianism ig-
nores the higher lawmaking procedures used to make the Constitu-
tion, which established certain supermajority and nondemocratic
procedures to ensure more deliberative decision making that better
reflected the popular will.
One common feature shared by most of these efforts is their criti-
cism of multiple methods for making international agreements.
Borchard and Tribe believe that Article II, Section 2 sets forth the
exclusive method to make treaties. 60 If the Constitution does not ex-
plicitly allow for congressional-executive agreements, there are no al-
ternatives. Henkin, Ackerman and Golove, and, more recently,
Hathaway argue that congressional-executive agreements should sup-
plant treaties because of their better democratic pedigree. 61 Whether
because of unusual theories of constitutional change or desires to re-
duce countermajoritarian features of the government, they see no rea-
son for the continued use of the Article II sequence. To them, the
treaty-making process is a relic of the nation's unhappy past, where
Southern concerns over slavery led to the Senate's exaggerated role.
The debate has this absolutist feature because it soon became entan-
gled in broader arguments over the legitimate method for interpret-
ing the Constitution and how it allows for change.
Despite these academic theories, practice shows little sign of fall-
ing on either the treaty-exclusivity side or the majoritarian side. The
58 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c. 1; id. at art. 1, § 8.
59 See Yoo, supra note 34, at 779-88.
60 See supra Part 1.
61 See supra Part I.
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national government continues to use congressional-executive agree-
ments, perhaps even as freely as Hathaway and Dixon claim. Never-
theless, the United States still reserves the Article II process for some
of the most significant national security issues. In the last decade, for
example, the Bush administration submitted the Treaty of Moscow,
which drastically cut American and Russian nuclear warhead arsenals,
to the Senate as a treaty.62 The Obama administration has done the
same with New START. 63
Instead of renewing the debate for or against the legitimacy of
these decisions, this Article asks instead about the consequences. It
seeks to understand the trade-offs of choosing one instrument over
the other by reversing the direction of the analysis. The earlier work
first attacks the question of interchangeability within the context of
familiar theories of constitutional interpretation and then asks about
the implications for making agreements on the international stage.
This Article begins with the international system to study its effects on
domestic constitutional structure. Treaties and congressional-execu-
tive agreements are poised to address different aspects of the difficul-
ties that nations encounter when making credible commitments. The
interaction of the international system and the domestic system can
find the solution for the interchangeability debate that has eluded
constitutional scholars.
II
TREATIES AS THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRISES
Because the conventional constitutional accounts remain unsatisfy-
ing, a more revealing approach may lie in a consequentialist account
of the making of international agreements. We can understand inter-
national agreements as a means for solving crises between nations. A
classic example is a peace treaty that ends a war, such as the Treaty of
Paris of 1783, which ended the Revolutionary War between the United
States and Great Britain.64 Treaties also can include agreements that
head off possible conflict, such as the agreement between the United
States and Great Britain to demarcate the border between the Oregon
territory and Canada. 65 They might also resolve struggles between na-
tions over land, with one side accepting payment in exchange for
foreswearing its claim to a territory. Examples are the Louisiana
Purchase, which transferred France's North American possessions to
62 The Senate consented to the Treaty on March 6, 2003. See 108 CONG. REc. S3243
(daily ed. Mar. 6, 2003).
63 The Senate consented to the Treaty on December 22, 2010. See 111 CONG. REC.
S10,982 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010).
64 See Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
65 See Convention with Great Britain, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Oct. 20, 1818, 8 Stat. 248.
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the United States for $20 million,66 the Adams-Onis treaty, which rec-
ognized American possession of Florida in exchange for a few million
dollars, 67 and Seward's Folly, as it was known, in which Russia sold
Alaska to the United States for another few million dollars. 68 Agree-
ments might also involve reciprocal treatment for the free flow of
commerce and travel, such as NAFTA, which will create surpluses and
losses that will be shared between the nations.69 Or they may limit
wasteful competition that allows nations to save resources or limit the
destructiveness of war, such as arms-control agreements. 70
This Article begins with a standard bargaining model drawn from
political science to understand these agreements. The model simpli-
fies international politics by assuming that two nations in a crisis can
choose between war and peace. In general, it assumes that war arises
because the nations have failed to reach a settlement, which would
otherwise be in their interests, because it would avoid the deadweight
losses of war. Thus, it treats international conflicts much in the way
that Robert Cooter and Daniel Rubinfeld model litigation as a choice
between settlement and trial in which the parties have an interest in
avoiding the deadweight losses of litigation costs. 7 1 It also works in
the same direction as scholars, such as Eric Posner and Jack Gold-
smith and Andrew Guzman, who have applied rational choice theory
to international law. 72 It is different from these approaches, however,
in linking international law with domestic law and in moving away
from the broader debate over compliance with customary interna-
tional law toward a more spartan model of international relations. In
this respect, this Article follows in the path charted by Robert Putnam
in seeking general equilibrium theories that account for the interac-
tion of international and domestic politics. 73
66 See Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr.,
Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200.
67 See Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.
68 See Treaty Concerning the Cessation of the Russian Possessions in North America,
U.S.-Russ., March 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539.
69 See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 10, at 289.
70 See Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Of-
fensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., May 13, 2010, S. TREATY Doc. No. 111-5.
71 See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989);
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 435 (1994).
72 See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & Eic A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
(2008); ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERIt.S OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (2009). But seeJens David Ohlin,
Nash Equilibrium and International Law, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 869, 888-89 (2011) (challeng-
ing rational choice theory on the grounds that it fails to consider the value of planning).
73 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,
42 INT'L ORG. 427, 430 (1988).
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There is an important difference between the applications of the
bargaining model to litigation and to international relations. Failure
to settle domestic legal claims usually results from informational asym-
metries and imbalances in financial resources to conduct litigation.74
Enforcement of a settlement is usually not a difficult question because
the parties fall within the personal jurisdiction of the court, which has
institutional resources to carry out orders. If a defendant, for exam-
ple, refuses to pay the damages called for by an agreement approved
by the court, a judge may levy fines or even hold the defendant in
contempt of court, which can result in jail time.
In international relations, by contrast, asymmetries in informa-
tion and resources form only part of the obstacles to a settlement.
Even if the parties have complete information, they still might not
reach an agreement because of an international environment charac-
terized by weak institutions. There are no effective supranational or-
ganizations that can coerce parties to obey treaties-at least nothing
like a domestic court. Without enforcement, nations still may not
enter into agreements that would avoid a wasteful conflict, especially if
the agreement involves issues that may shift the balance of power in
the future.
Much of the international relations literature focuses on why na-
tions go to war. This Part builds on that analysis, but turns it toward
ways that a domestic constitutional system can help find a stable
peace. In particular, it builds on efforts to explain the "democratic
peace"-the empirical correlation that democracies in the period
since 1814 do not fight wars against each other-within the frame-
work of international conflict as bargaining failure. 75 Political scien-
tists have sought to explain why democracies do not war with each
other by looking to features of their domestic political structures. 76
Democracies might not go to war with each other because their rela-
tively transparent political systems may facilitate negotiations. 77 An
overlooked area in this vein may be domestic constitutional arrange-
ments. Because weak to nonexistent enforcement by effective interna-
tional institutions remains a stumbling block, nations that can commit
more deeply to keeping international agreements may have an advan-
tage in world affairs.
74 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15
RANDJ. ECON. 404 (1984) (discussing how informational asymmetry influences settlement
decisions).
75 See sources cited infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
76 See sources cited infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
77 See sources cited infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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A. Conflict as Bargaining Failure
As Thomas Schelling observed, "conflict situations are essentially
bargaining situations."78 Nations have disputes because of competing
interests. A nation may wish to gain a good, like territory or popula-
tion or trading rights. Or it may wish to stop harm, such as pollution,
population migration, or international crime and terrorism. Another
nation may want to acquire the same territory for itself, or it may want
the harm to continue because it is a negative externality of conduct
that benefits it.
Nations acting rationally should generally reach a settlement of
their conflicting goals. It is in their interests to divide the benefits of a
good through negotiation rather than to escalate their dispute into a
conflict. A conflict will cause deadweight losses-such as the lives and
treasure lost in war-or will require the nations to spend resources on
arms and security that it might otherwise allocate to more productive
uses. War, in other words, reduces the size of the pie that two nations
in a dispute can divide; they should reach a Pareto-superior settlement
that will leave each nation better off than if they go to war. War is, as
Robert Powell puts it, an "inefficiency puzzle." 79 This insight has
given rise to a bargaining theory approach to conflict, which has be-
come a leading approach to the study of crisis, escalation, and war in
political science.80
Since Schelling's insight, this flourishing literature has formal-
ized the causes of war. The model works as the following example
illustrates. Imagine that the United States and China have a dispute
for control over a territory. The United States currently controls the
territory, and China wishes to gain a share of it. China makes a de-
mand accompanied by a threat. The United States can decide to re-
sist or accede to China's demand. If the United States decides to
transfer the share of the territory to China, the game ends. If the
United States resists, then China must decide whether to go to war.
78 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 5 (1960) (emphasis omitted).
79 Robert Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, 60 INT'L ORG. 169, 169 (2006) [herein-
after Powell, War as a Commitment Problem]; see also Robert Powell, The Inefficient Use of Power:
Costly Conflict with Complete Information, 98 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 231, 235-37 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Powell, The Inefficient Use of Power] (describing war and related activities as inefficient
uses of power).
80 See, e.g., Dan Reiter, Exploring the Bargaining Model of War, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 27
(2003) (discussing bargaining theory and comparing it with other theories of war); see also
ROBERT POWELL, IN THE SHADOW OF POWER: STATES AND STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1999); James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INT'L ORG. 379, 380
(1995) ("[Wlar is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negoti-
ated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war."). But see David A. Lake, Two
Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War, 35 INT'L SECUR-




Iterations of counteroffers and counterresponses can occur between
China's first demand and the United States' final response, but at the
end the United States must choose between resistance or transfer, and
China must decide whether to go to war if the United States resists.
War may produce a victory that brings part of the disputed terri-
tory, or even all of it. But the outcome of war is uncertain. Making
the right decision whether to resist or accede will depend on the
probability of the outcome of conflict between the armed forces of the
United States and China. If the expected value of going to war ex-
ceeds the expected costs, China should go to war in response to a U.S.
rejection of its offer. If the expected costs exceed the expected value,
China should not go to war. On the flip side, if the United States'
expected cost of war exceeds its expected gain, the United States
should agree to China's demand. If the opposite holds true, the
United States should resist China's demand and its threats.
The expected gains and costs are a function of probability of vic-
tory, the value of the territory, and the anticipated destruction of war.
As a formula, the expected value of war to China will be
W(China) = P(China) x V(China) - C(China),
where W(China) means the expected value of war to China; P(China)
means the probability that China would prevail in war; V(China)
means the value of the territory to China, and C(China) means the
cost of war. P(China) x V(China) is the expected value of gaining the
territory.
Similarly, the expected value of war to the United States will be
W(U.S.) = P(U.S.) x V(U.S.) - (U.S.),
where W(U.S.) means the expected value of war to the United States;
P(U.S.) means the probability that the United States would prevail in
war; V(U.S.) means the value of the territory to the United States; and
C(U.S.) means the cost of war to the United States.
A further point is worth making on P. The probability that China
would prevail in war is the primary uncertainty. It is a function of
more than just economic resources, such as the size and configuration
of the Chinese armed forces, which depends on spending, as well as
factors such as organization, leadership, experience, and technology.
It is also relative, as it depends on how Chinese forces are likely to fare
against the armed forces of the United States, rather than another
country. Because of this relationship, P(China) + P(U.S.) = 1. In
other words, unless China were certain it would prevail in war,
P(China) must be less than one. The probability that the United
States would prevail must be the remainder.
A similar relationship does not necessarily obtain for the other
variables in the equation. The value of the territory to China may not
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be the same as the value to the United States. For example, the terri-
tory might have a fixed estimated value in resources, but one side may
have better technology or organizations to exploit them. But a given
territory might also have more cultural or defense importance for one
side than another-possessing Taiwan, for example, will have greater
value to China because of China's desire to unify historical Chinese
territory under its control. The cost of war may also differ between
the contending nations. One nation may suffer smaller losses at cer-
tain probabilities of winning because of different investments in and
effectiveness of its armed forces, difference in the value of lives be-
tween the nations, and strategic and tactical disparities. For example,
the United States, by investing more productively in its armed forces,
may suffer fewer casualties by going to war than China, but the higher
per-capita GDP might also mean that each U.S. life lost in a conflict is
more valuable.
War should not erupt under conditions of perfect information.
Suppose that China wishes to obtain territory within the control of the
United States. If W(China) is negative, the expected value of a Chi-
nese victory is less than the expected cost of war. The United States
should reject China's offer, and China will back down; no war will
result. If W(China) is positive, the expected value of Chinese victory is
greater than the expected cost of war. The United States knows that
China will go to war if the demand is rejected. The United States
should reach a negotiated settlement, unless China's valuation of the
territory is so great relative to the United States' that any settlement
would require the United States to give China so much in concessions
that the United States would be better off going to war. A similar
situation arises when the United States' valuation is so great relative to
China's. However, when the valuations of the two countries are al-
most equivalent, negotiating an agreement will place both countries
strictly better off as opposed to going to war.
Under certain conditions, the range of potential outcomes of ne-
gotiations is predictable. Assume that the value of the territory is
roughly the same for both China and the United States, perhaps be-
cause the territory's value lies in its physical resources. In other
words, V(China) = V(U.S.), denoted simply by Vin this example. As-
sume also that China's probability of winning is 67% and the United
States' probability is 33%. Since the value of any settlement to China,
S(China), must make China better off than it would have expected to
be from going to war: S(China) > W(China) = 67% x V- C(China).
Similarly, the value of any settlement to the United States, S(U.S.),
must make it better off than it would have been had it gone to war:
S(U.S.) > W(U.S.) = 33% x V- C(U.S.). By making use of the fact that
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in a zero-sum game, such as this one, S(China) + S(U.S.) = V, it can
easily be shown that
67% x V- C(China) < S(China) < 67% x V+ C(U.S.)
and
33% x V- C(U.S.) < S(U.S.) < 33% x V+ C(China).
While the value of the settlement to each country must exceed its
expected value from going to war, it also must not exceed its expected
value of the territory plus the other country's deadweight loss from
war. If the latter condition does not hold, a country has captured
more than the entire deadweight loss the other country was trying to
avoid by negotiating a settlement. Thus, the other country is worse off
by the settlement than it would have been had it gone to war. Both
countries should accept a negotiated settlement along these lines be-
cause they will avoid incurring the deadweight costs of the conflict
itself.
B. Incomplete Information and Settlement
Incomplete information can prevent the United States and China
from reaching a settlement, even if both nations act rationally, as
sketched out in Part II.A. With imperfect information, the United
States cannot accurately estimate China's expected value from war,
W(China), and the same for China and W(U.S.). Even if both the
United States and China have a fair sense of the value of the territory
to the other, they will have a difficult time estimating the probability
of victory. Some factors that influence P(China) and P(U.S.) could
prove observable by monitoring public budgets, following military ex-
ercises, providing national technical means of surveillance such as
satellites, and practicing espionage. Through these means, China and
the United States could estimate the size of an opponent's armed
forces, the spending devoted to defense, the nature of weapon sys-
tems, and military performance on certain terrains. But other factors
will lie within the private information of each country, such as military
capabilities, strategies and tactics, unit morale and effectiveness, and
the willingness of the national population and leadership to devote
resources and take losses in a drawn-out conflict.
Not only will this information be private, but nations may have an
incentive to manipulate public knowledge. They may wish to hide
their strengths in order to achieve tactical surprise. China, for exam-
ple, concealed its movement of large forces into North Korea as Gen-
eral MacArthur's forces approached the Yalu River in 1950 in order to
win a significant victory.81 Or nations might want to exaggerate their
81 JAMES L. STOKESBURY, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR 97-102 (1988).
20111
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
strength in order to bluff in negotiations. Germany hid its military
weakness as it succeeded in annexing Czechoslovakia in 1938 and in-
vading Poland without any military response by Great Britain or
France.8 2 Different estimates about the probability of success in war,
therefore, can arise even without introducing irrationality, such as an
emotional overestimate of the valor of a nation's troops, or bounded
rationality stemming from the overwhelming complexity of predicting
the outcome of armed conflict.
War can result because of asymmetric information on the
probability of winning a conflict. If China underestimates P(U.S.), for
example, it will assume that W(U.S.) is lower than it actually is. This
will lead it to demand more of the disputed territory than it should,
and it will expect the United States to concede at a lower level of
threat than it will. Ultimately, China's misreading of P(U.S.) will in-
crease the lower end of the range of offers that China will accept.
This will increase the chances of war, because the United States will be
willing to go to war when its expected value from war exceeds the
costs and it cannot reach an agreement with China that will allow it to
avoid the costs of war. Another effect of asymmetric information
mentioned above is that nations may bluff. If W(China) is uncertain,
for example, due to private information of P(China), the United
States does not know whether China's demand genuinely reflects the
distribution of existing power, and cannot decide on firm information
whether to concede or go to war. China could be exaggerating its
probability of victory to get better terms, and the United States could
be doing the same in response.
Political science scholars have explored whether domestic factors
can help overcome the bargaining problems created by asymmetric
information. Rational choice studies have suggested that the factual
correlation that democracies do not fight wars with each other may
stem from the advantages that democracies enjoy over nondemocra-
cies in revealing private information credibly.8 3 Several statistical
studies have shown that democracies since 1814 do not wage war
against each other, but that they fight autocracies regularly and win a
high percentage of those conflicts, and that they suffer lower casual-
ties and fight for shorter periods than autocracies.8 4 One set of schol-
ars explains this phenomenon by claiming that democracies place
82 See generally ERNEST R. MAY, STRANGE VIcTORY (2000) (explaining that Britain and
France greatly overestimated Germany's military strength).
83 See infra notes 87-88.
84 See DAN REITER & ALLAN C. STAm, DEMOCRACIES AT WAR 4 (2002) (finding that
democracies emerge victorious because they start winnable wars and because their soldiers
fight with higher military effectiveness); David A. Lake, Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States
and War, 86 AM. POL. Sci. RFv. 24, 24 (1992). But see D. Scott Bennett & Allan C. Stam III,
The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration, 42 J.
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institutional constraints on war because of viable opposition parties
that will take power in the event of defeat and the unwillingness of the
population to take high casualties . 5 We will not take up those theo-
ries here.
More usefully here, a second set of scholars argues that the demo-
cratic peace may arise because democracies can better solve asymmet-
ric information problems in international bargaining. 86 States can
reach settlements if they can reveal private information about their
probabilities of winning, but they must do so credibly. The possibility
of bluffing and the absence of strong governmental institutions make
this difficult. Economists have shown that, even in such circum-
stances, negotiators can act credibly through the use of costly sig-
nals.8 7 By revealing information in a way that generates significant
costs, nations can separate themselves from those who would bluff. If
the P(U.S.) is high, it could take steps during its crisis with China that
have greater costs-such as large-scale military deployments-than
those taken by a nation whose probability of winning was lower.
Democracies may have greater facility in sending costly signals be-
cause of audience costs. "Audience costs" refers to the domestic costs
incurred by a governing regime when it suffers a setback in foreign
affairs.88 The simple idea is that a state has two groups, the governing
regime and its supporters, and the opposition. If the ruling party
makes a threat to use force and backs down, it will suffer domestic
political costs, both among its own supporters and the opposition
CONFLIcT RESOL. 344, 365 (1998) (contending that autocracies have the advantage over
democracies in long wars).
85 See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Randolph M. Siverson, War and the Survival of Politi-
cal Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability, 89 Am. POL. SCi.
REv. 841, 841 (1995); Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 A. POL. Sci. REv.
1151, 1160-61 (1986); James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of Inter-
national Disputes, 88 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 577, 577 (1994); James Fearon, Signaling Foreign
Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 68, 69-70 (1997);
Christopher F. Gelpi & Michael Griesdorf, Winners or Losers? Democracies in International
Crisis, 1918-1994, 95 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 633, 634 (2001); Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett, Nor-
mative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986, 87 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 624,
625-26 (1993); Dan Reiter & Allan C. Stam III, Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory, 92 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 377, 378 (1998); Kenneth A. Schultz, Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or
Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War, 53 INT'L ORG. 233, 236
(1999).
86 See sources cited infra note 88.
87 See EPic A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRMs 19-21 (2000).
88 See, e.g., James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes, supra note 85, at 585-86 (stating that democracies are less likely to back down in
an international crisis because they generate greater audience costs than do nondemocra-
cies); Kenneth A. Schultz, Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Insti-
tutional Perspectives on Democracy and War, 53 INT'L ORG. 233, 236-37 (1999); Kenneth A.
Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises, 92 AM. POL. ScL REv. 829,
830 (1998); Branislav L. Slantchev, Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs, 50
INT'L STUD. Q. 445, 447 (2006).
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party. This dynamic is not unique to democracies, but in systems with
competitive, representative elections, the audience costs will be signifi-
candy higher. Audience costs can appear in a democracy in several
ways. First, public threats to use force in the event of a crisis will cre-
ate high audience costs if a leader backs down. Second, opposition
parties will demand more information about a crisis and the nation's
strategies, which will generally be aired publicly. Third, a democracy
might separate the foreign affairs power into executive and legislative
branches, in which case the former may need to cooperate with the
latter to undertake any military steps to follow through on a threat.
And obviously, a setback in conflict or settlement will undermine the
regime in the next elections.
Understood in these ways, however, audience costs may also offer
a means for democracies to better signal their private information. If
the American President makes public declarations of military mea-
sures to be taken in the event that China escalates during a crisis-like
President John F. Kennedy's threats in the event that Soviet missiles
were not removed during the Cuban Missile Crisis 89-the President
will suffer high domestic political costs for not following through. To
justify the case for war, the President will disclose to the electorate
information about the nature of the threat, the likelihood of winning,
and why the war advances the national interest. If the President seeks
funds or authorization from Congress, the President will disclose even
more information about the likelihood and outcome of a conflict, and
any legislative approval will provide even more signals about national
resolve and willingness to bear casualties and costs in a conflict. De-
mocracies, however, will balance the gains from credible signaling
against the costs in delaying action and giving up tactical surprise,
which may prove more valuable against autocracies or terrorist
groups.
The nature of the signals may affect whether the crisis leads to
conflict or settlement. Costly signals in the context of international
bargaining may take two forms.90 An American President who
promises war, like President George H.W. Bush did in response to
Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, in effect "ties his hands."91 This is a
credible signal because the President will suffer ex post audience costs
if he or she does not follow through on the threat. An American Pres-
89 See Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms
Buildup in Cuba, 1 PuB. PAPERS 806, 807-08 (Oct. 22, 1962).
90 SeeJames D. Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,
supra note 85, at 70; Branislav L. Slantchev, Military Coercion in Interstate Crises, 99 Am. POL.
Sci. REV. 533, 545 (2005) (noting that military mobilization both sinks costs and ties
hands).




ident can send a second type of signal by mobilizing the armed forces
or, less immediately, engaging in an arms buildup or constructing cer-
tain types of weapon systems.92 This type of signal is a sunk cost. It
generates costs ex ante, unlike tying hands, because it requires the ex-
penditure of resources before the final decision on war or settlement.
But it does not bear ex post audience costs if a threat remains unreal-
ized. Interestingly, tying-hands signals arguably increase the chances
of war because they increase future costs if the United States does not
engage in a conflict, even if W(China) and W(U.S.) remain un-
changed. Sunk costs do not have this effect because they do not alter
the future values of either war or settlement; once the money is spent,
it is spent.
Part III will examine how different domestic constitutional ar-
rangements affect the types of signals sent during international dis-
putes. As I have argued elsewhere, an American President can send
credible signals by involving Congress in his decision to go to war, that
these signals can be of the tying-hands or sunk-cost variety, and that
the advantage of sending signals must be balanced against the nature
of the opponent. What has gone relatively unexamined in the litera-
ture is the other choice, the one of settlement. Different paths toward
the making of international agreements may send different types of
signals. These may enhance the credibility of the signal, they may
generate different audience costs, and they too may be of the tying-
hands or sunk-cost kind. But before we discuss the value of signals in
overcoming international disputes, we must still address a second,
greater obstacle.
C. Conflict as a Commitment Problem
The preceding subpart described the information problems that
cause war-nations hold private information about their probability
of winning and cannot credibly communicate it to the other side. But
a second, perhaps more difficult, problem remains even with perfect
information: nations may refuse settlement because there is no supra-
national institution that can meaningfully enforce their commitment.
Along another dimension, incentives may arise after the agreement
that urge one of the parties to renege. Conceived in this way, the
commitment problem may be particularly acute in situations of rap-
idly changing shifts in the distribution of power. 93 These problems
may prevent, in our hypothetical, China and the United States from
92 See Fearon, supra note 90.
93 See Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, supra note 79, at 171-72 (arguing that the




reaching an agreement even when perfect information and credible
signals exist.
One way to understand the difficulty of the commitment problem
is to examine the limitations of the theory that war results from asym-
metric information. Examples of civil wars or prolonged fighting
highlight the drawbacks. Under the information explanation, such
wars result from the failure of each side to credibly communicate its
true military capabilities and political resolve, leading to a bargaining
failure. But with civil wars, after a few years, if not immediately, war-
ring parties should gain ample information on the resources, organi-
zation, and tactics of the other.94 Yet the war continues. 95 This
insight might also apply to crises that develop into wars of long dura-
tion. By 1940 and 1941, Great Britain and Germany had been at war
for a year and Germany had decided to launch the aerial Battle of
Britain as a prelude to invasion. Germany could have sought a sepa-
rate peace in the West that left Britain alone. War did not continue, it
seems, because of German misunderstanding of British resolve and
resources, or vice versa. Complete information did not end the fight-
ing. In fact, one could argue that the more the British learned about
Hitler, the more they decided that they would fight him.96
Recent political science work argues that the real culprit to such
bargaining failures is not asymmetric information, but commitment
problems. 97 With complete information, states can identify a range of
bargains that they will prefer to war. In fact, as the cost of fighting
increases, the range of bargains will broaden because both will benefit
more by avoiding expensive war. States cannot reach these agree-
ments because of an inability to keep the commitment, not a failure to
identify the Pareto-optimal settlement. Work on commitment has
identified similar problems in areas other than international relations,
such as coups and civil wars, transitions to democracy, government
spending, and independent agencies.
Commitment problems will be especially pronounced when the
distribution of power between actors changes rapidly.98 If China and
the United States, for example, are trying to reach an agreement over
the division of a territory, they are using their power to lock in a cer-
94 Id. at 173.
95 SeeJames D. Fearon, Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others , 41 J.
PEACE RES. 275, 275-76 (2004) (observing that the average duration of civil wars was almost
sixteen years in 1999).
96 See Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, supra note 79, at 175-76 (stating that Brit-
ain and Germany would have fought each other even if they had complete information
because the latter demanded more than the former was willing to accommodate).
97 See Fearon, supra note 95, at 291-98; Powell, The Inefficient Use of Power, supra note
79, at 231; Branislav L. Slantchev, The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed
States, 97 AM. POL. Sci. Rav. 123, 128 (2003).
98 See Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, supra note 79, at 181.
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tain flow of future benefits. As discussed in Part II.B, that division will
mirror the balance of power between China and the United States.
But if China is rapidly increasing its military power because of explo-
sive economic growth, it will have a strong incentive to renege on the
deal and use its better position to seek a greater share of the territory.
This may occur even though a share of the pie will be destroyed be-
cause of war itself. The agreement might even accentuate this dy-
namic by sending resource flows to China that will allow it to
accelerate its economic growth and accompanying military expansion.
Or the agreement may require the United States to expend so many
resources to maintain the status quo in the future that it would rather
fight now than spend later. Knowing this, the United States will not
trust China to keep any commitment it makes in the present and may
instead seek war now to lock in its share of resources, rather than face
a steeper balance of forces in the future.99 This explains why interna-
tional agreements are unlikely to solve situations of first-strike pre-
emptive attack and preventive war, because the attacker has a
significant advantage in military resources in the present that will sig-
nificantly erode in the future.
Domestic political arrangements may help overcome these com-
mitment problems, just as they did with asymmetric information. Po-
litical scientists have not yet extended the commitment analysis to
include audience costs, but we can see where it might lead. If a de-
mocracy has a ruling party and an opposition party, it might be able to
make a more credible commitment by giving a veto over any future
effort to renege to the opposition party. It could try to commit itself
by requiring the expenditure of high levels of political capital to break
the agreement in the future. Or it might devote resources to compli-
ance that would be lost in the event of withdrawal, something like the
giving of a hostage as part of a peace treaty in the ancient world. Part
III will return to the debate over treaty making under the American
Constitution to analyze the way that the choice of instruments bears
on the problems of commitment and asymmetric information.
III
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
This Part uses the tools of Part II to approach the puzzles de-
scribed in Part I. As with political science studies of why nations
choose war, this Part examines why nations cannot make peace. For
simplicity, it assumes that two nations in a dispute can choose between
war and peace. Peace can occur if a nation backs down and the status




the resources or territory in line with the balance of power between
them. We will leave to another day examination of multilateral agree-
ments that extend beyond individualized disputes.
Part II's model identifies two ways that negotiations can fail de-
spite the presence of Pareto-optimal bargains and the avoidance of
the deadweight loss of war. The first is asymmetric information; the
second is commitment. Choosing a treaty or the congressional-
executive agreement route to make an international agreement may
bear on both of these problems. John Setear has observed that using
the Article II treaty process can send a costly signal of commitment
because it requires more political capital to win the higher majority
for approval. 00 Lisa Martin makes a similar point comparing treaties
with sole executive agreements. 1 1 This point confuses the asymmet-
ric information and commitment issues. Treaties and congressional-
executive agreements have different trade-offs on these issues because
of differences in the timing of important steps in the approval pro-
cess, the level of political support required, the means of implementa-
tion, and the process for withdrawal. Different paths for termination
of an international agreement, in particular, have important bearing
on the commitment problem.
Hathaway, by contrast, observes that congressional-executive
agreements provide more durable commitments than treaties, which
enhances the democratic nature of using Article I to make interna-
tional agreements.10 2 It is unclear why democratic theory should want
to make it difficult for a nation to renege on its international agree-
ments. In fact, a purely majoritarian system might prefer termination
of treaties solely by the President, who is the only federal official,
along with the Vice President, elected by the nation as a whole. In any
case, Hathaway elides the two different types of problems in making
international agreements-credibly revealing private information and
the threat of reneging.10 3 It is important to understand that both vari-
ables are present in international disputes, and the choice of instru-
ments has different trade-offs for their resolution.
It is necessary to underscore a point that frames the following
discussion. While the scholarship to date has debated the legitimacy
of treaties versus congressional-executive agreements, this Article does
not view legitimacy as the critical question. Whether the Constitution
demands treaties or democracy demands congressional-executive
100 SeeJohn K. Setear, The President's Rational Choice of a Treaty's Preratification Pathway:
Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S5, S28
(2002).
101 See Lisa L. Martin, The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling
Devices, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 440, 446 (2005).
102 See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1316-38.
103 See id. at 1323-38.
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agreements, the political branches continue to use both forms, and
the courts show little desire to overturn practice. Scholarly debate
over the legitimacy of the use of the congressional-executive agree-
ment to approve NAFTA had little effect on Congress or the executive
branch. Nor have recent claims for full interchangeability convinced
the President to seek approval of certain types of agreements, such as
the rejected Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or New START, through
Article I rather than the Article II process.
Rather, this Article examines the consequences of choosing be--
tween treaties and congressional-executive agreements. Part II ex-
plains how multiple forms of international agreements are not a
problem, but a solution to the problem of bargaining between na-
tions. The availability of both types of agreements allows the United
States to choose the amount of information and level of commitment
it wants to communicate. This should help the United States over-
come the problems of asymmetric information and lack of enforce-
ment that beset negotiations in an international system that lacks
strong institutions.
A. Choice of Instruments as Informational Signals
As demonstrated in Part II, one of the chief obstacles to the settle-
ment of an international dispute is asymmetric information. Parties
hold private information that bears directly on the expected value of
war. Without that information, the other party cannot determine the
range for an appropriate bargain. This problem is compounded by
the possibility that an opponent is bluffing.
Consider how the choice of instruments might affect this dy-
namic. In the context of the decision whether to go to war, I have
argued elsewhere that a U.S. President could seek congressional sup-
port for a conflict as a way to send a credible signal of the nation's
private information concerning its ability to prevail in a conflict.
10 4
Placed in the U.S.-China example, this would make the United States'
expected value of a war
W(U.S.) - AC(U.S.) = P(U.S.) x V(U.S.) - C(U.S.) - AC(U.S.),
where AC(U.S.) refers to audience costs. In the political science liter-
ature, scholars think of audience costs as the political price that the
President will incur by publicly making a threat against another nation
that he does not fulfill. Here, we can think of AC(U.S.) as the political
cost of seeking the approval of another branch of government for sup-
port. Assuming that the costs of a conflict and the value of the terri-
tory to the United States remain the same regardless of the signal, the




expensive signal reveals information to China about the magnitude of
P(U.S.), the probability of winning a conflict.
Audience costs play a similar role in reaching international agree-
ments. If the agreement, in our hypothetical, is a way to avoid war,
then audience costs can again reveal P(U.S.). In fact, it might do this
in a more direct way because of the difference between making a
threat before a conflict and of approving either a treaty or a congres-
sional-executive agreement afterward. When the United States makes
an international agreement, the President first negotiates and signs
the treaty or congressional-executive agreement and then submits it to
the Senate (if the former) or to Congress (if the latter). The agree-
ment does not take effect until after legislative approval, followed by
presidential ratification. The other party, here China, can also decide
to reject the agreement as it waits to see the results of the approval
process in the Senate or Congress.
In the course of legislative approval, the executive branch usually
reveals information to the Senate or Congress in public to convince it
to approve. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example,
will hold public hearings where executive branch officials will testify
under oath about the benefits of international cooperation to the na-
tional interest. One inevitable question is whether the United States
would be better off if the Senate did not ratify the agreement. The
executive branch would have to explain what W(U.S.) would be if the
dispute escalates into war. If the value of the territory remains con-
stant, the public testimony would reveal the executive branch's esti-
mate of its probability of winning and the cost of the war.
Misrepresenting this information to the Senate would have costs, in-
cluding sanctions against the executive branch officials, difficulties for
the President in the approval of future agreements, and disruption of
foreign policy in the subject matter of the treaty. Executive branch
testimony and Senate consideration provides important private infor-
mation that can be seen as part of the negotiating process itself, since
it occurs after the President has signed the treaty, but before it is ap-
proved and ratified.
This should provide a powerful help to reaching an agreement.
Consider again the U.S.-China hypothetical. Suppose that the United
States and China reach a tentative agreement on allocating the terri-
tory in dispute. As Part II showed, this division will depend upon P
and the deadweight loss of war, C. If China has a 50% chance of win-
ning a conflict, it should get approximately half of the territory, plus
or minus the deadweight losses of war to the United States and China.
The exact outcome of the settlement negotiations would depend on
variables not included in our model. When the Senate considers the
proposed treaty, members of the Foreign Relations Committee will
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ask whether the President should have gotten a better deal. To justify
the negotiated division, the executive branch will have to reveal to the
Senate its probability of winning and its estimates of the cost of war. If
the revealed information does not match up with China's understand-
ing of P(U.S.) and C(U.S.), it can refuse to ratify the agreement. If
the President were to say, for example, that the agreement is a great
deal for the United States, because P(U.S.) was really only 40%, China
will not ratify the agreement and may choose war instead because it
will have a 60% of winning the whole territory.
Up to this point, there is no difference between the Article II
treaty process and the Article I statutory method. The choice of in-
struments will not affect the type of information communicated about
the probability of winning, but rather the strength of its credibility
beyond the political costs that a President would suffer for misrepre-
senting information to Congress. Taking the Article II route requires
the President to convince two-thirds of the Senate to agree to the
treaty. A blocking coalition of thirty-four Senators need represent the
population of only the smallest one-third of states by population. This
could be as small as 7.4% of the population (the amount of the na-
tion's population contained by the seventeen smallest states), or 22.7
million out of the U.S. population of 307 million in 2009.105 By con-
trast, the minority needed to block legislation in the Senate can be as
small as 16% of the population (the population of the twenty-five
smallest states).
The Article I route, by contrast, requires simple majorities of both
the House and Senate. To get through the House, the President need
only convince the representatives of 51% of the majority of the popu-
lation. To get through the Senate, the President must only persuade
fifty-one Senators, instead of sixty-seven as with an Article II treaty.
This assumes that a simple majority of the Senate does not actually
represent 51% of the population. It might. But if the twenty-five
smallest states vote together, enactment of a statute requires the other
twenty-five to cooperate-84% of the population. In fact, to take ac-
count of Senate rules, a minority opposed to a congressional-executive
agreement would need the votes of only the smallest twenty states,
which represent about 10% of the population-enough votes to sus-
tain a filibuster that would prevent the bill from coming to a vote.
Nevertheless, the President will consume more political capital to con-
105 Wyoming, the smallest state by population, has 544,270 people; Utah, the seven-
teenth smallest state, has 2.7 million inhabitants. See Table 1. Annual Estimates of the Resident
Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009,
U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited
Aug. 27, 2011) (follow "Excel" hyperlink).
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vince the representatives of 93% of the population, via a treaty, rather
than the representatives of 84% of the population, via a statute.
In the terminology of our earlier equation, choosing the treaty
process over the congressional-executive route will increase audience
costs. That increase will be equivalent to the additional political capi-
tal needed to win the votes of 9% of the population (the difference
between 84% of the population for a statute and 93% of the popula-
tion for a treaty). It may be the case that this is not a great amount,
but the marginal difference allows the United States to increase the
cost, and hence the credibility, of its signal. Treaties thus provide a
more credible means for the United States to reveal private informa-
tion to its negotiating partner than the enactment of a statute.
In fact, it seems that the United States might be willing to incur
audience costs even beyond the expected value of war if it expected to
get an agreement that it values much more than going to war. Con-
sider how the government would determine whether to continue in-
curring audience costs or to stop and either settle or go to war. On
the margin, the government would incur an additional unit of audi-
ence costs until the marginal benefit of doing so equals the marginal
cost. The marginal benefit is the increase in potential settlement
value if the parties agree to settle and the marginal cost is the addi-
tional unit of audience costs. As more information is revealed
through audience costs, China will refine its beliefs about the
probability that the United States will win, and the costs of war to the
United States. However, at some point the release of additional infor-
mation will cease to be rational because the additional unit of audi-
ence costs will exceed the increase in settlement value to the United
States due to the large quantity of already available data. If the poten-
tial settlement value is much greater than the expected value of war,
the United States may determine it is rational to increase audience
costs beyond even the expected value of war if it believes that China is
likely to settle once it has all of the relevant information on P and C.
A watching adversary will see that the President's political efforts
to win legislative approval make it less likely that the United States is
bluffing. The more expensive the audience costs, the less likely that
the President has misrepresented the probability of American victory.
The different paths to the approval of an international agreement al-
low the United States to send varying signals about private informa-
tion. While the international relations literature does not further
distinguish audience costs, we can identify two types of information
communicated through the advice-and-consent process. The first is
simply the costs of the political effort to secure Senate or congres-
sional approval. A President will expend political capital to build a
majority or supermajority to approve the agreement,just as the execu-
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tive will incur costs to convince Congress to pass its domestic legisla-
tive program. Presidents may take time and resources away from
other priorities, offer legislators favors for their votes, and risk public
support to push an international agreement forward. These costs mir-
ror the costs that Presidents incur to convince Congress to enact their
legislative agenda. Political audience costs send a costly signal, but the
nature of the signal itself is not important, only the cost.
A second dimension of the signal is the substance of the informa-
tion communicated during the advice-and-consent process. Presi-
dents will need to explain to the Senate the reasons why a treaty is in
the national interest. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will
hold hearings in which administration witnesses will respond, under
oath, to questions about the agreement. This will reveal in public
more information about the United States' expected value from the
agreement, which will give the other party more information on the
value of the asset and the probability of victory in the event of a con-
flict. Senators, for example, might demand that the administration
explain why a treaty does not give away the store, but instead carries
nonobvious advantages for the United States. This signal is even more
credible if the Senate is controlled by the opposite political party from
the President's, which will be more demanding and harder to
convince.
The difference between the two types of information-the costs
of the signal and its content-is analogous to the difference between
quantity and quality. The former involves the amount of resources
expended by the executive branch to get a treaty through the Senate.
The latter involves the information communicated as part of that pro-
cess. A bargaining state, however, might discount both as a bluff.
China, for example, might suspect that the President and Senate are
colluding to inflate the political costs of advice and consent to a treaty
settling its dispute with the United States. The only reason why China
might believe the audience costs is if it is confident in the reliability of
the Constitution's division of the treaty-making authority between the
President and the Senate and the institutional independence of each.
Or, the other party might take the division of the treaty-making power
so seriously as to doubt whether it has won an equitable division of the
bargaining surplus if the President wins a supermajority in the legisla-
ture. China, for example, may believe that it negotiated a good deal
for itself only if the President can convince a bare majority of Con-
gress to agree. If two-thirds of the Senate, however, readily approve a
treaty, China might believe that it has given up too much to the
United States-much in the same way that a car buyer might believe




The Constitution addresses the first concern, bargaining theory
the second. The more the Constitution truly organizes and limits
power horizontally within the federal government, the more credible
audience costs will be. If formal constitutional rules, for example,
bear little resemblance to actual political practice-as occurred in
communist countries during the Cold War-the other nation may not
take seriously any apparent political exertions to win approval of a
treaty. Conversely, the more that the political branches obey the Con-
stitution, even incurring inconvenient political costs to obey its separa-
tion of powers, the more the other nation will believe a costly signal.
The second problem can be thought of as a transaction cost. Bargain-
ing theory predicts that the two parties to an international dispute
should reach an agreement that avoids the deadweight costs of war,
should they be able to overcome the problems of asymmetric informa-
tion and commitment failure. It does not necessarily predict, how-
ever, that the two parties will divide the surplus precisely in line with
their relative power. Nonetheless, if two nations receive information
that the division is not in line with their relative power, they will seek
to renegotiate the agreement until they come close. At that point, the
Senate may approve the agreement anyway, because it knows that the
treaty will allow the United States to avoid the costs of war and that it
cannot improve its position any further.
These differences in the nature of signals might provide a partial
explanation for the use of treaties for major agreements involving po-
litical alliances like NATO or arms-control agreements like New
START or the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the use of con-
gressional-executive agreements for economic matters like the IMF,
Bretton Woods, NAFTA, and the WTO. The former address matters
dear to a nation's security from attack, and as such will involve capabil-
ities that a nation will usually keep secret, such as military forces and
deployments, readiness and spending, and types of weapons. To
reach agreement, for example, the parties to an arms-control agree-
ment must make credible disclosures about the size and shape of their
arsenals.
With other types of agreements, the need to reveal private infor-
mation may prove less pressing. Economic agreements may suffer less
from problems of asymmetric information. Nations will already have
disclosed publicly a great deal of information about their economies
for reasons unrelated to the international agreement. The United
States, for example, regularly reports for domestic reasons a host of
statistics on economic growth, employment, industrial activity, and la-
bor and capital deployment. It requires companies to release a great
deal of information to ensure the smooth functioning of its markets.
Private economic analysts have their own incentives to determine the
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effects of a trade agreement on different industry segments. A gov-
ernment will possess less private information about the future effects
of an international economic agreement, and so it will have less need
to send a costly signal to reveal it.
There is one more feature of the communication of information
worth mentioning. Part II distinguishes between informational signals
that "tied hands" and those that were sunk costs. The former costs
relatively little but increases instability, while the latter are costly but
improve stability because once spent they are lost. Viewed on this
axis, treaties fall more along the lines of a tying-hands signal, while
congressional-executive agreements evoke more of a sunk cost. Trea-
ties promise that the United States will live up to certain commit-
ments, but they still require further implementing steps, such as the
passage of legislation or the destruction of weapons, that will take
place in the future. Congressional-executive agreements, by contrast,
combine the international agreement and the implementing legisla-
tion in one package. The statutes adopting WTO and NAFTA both
approved the agreements and made changes to domestic tariff and
trade laws necessary to comply with their terms. This may mean that
while Article II treaties reveal more private information, they also raise
the political stakes for the President because of the need to follow
through on promises made both to the foreign treaty partner and
before domestic political audiences. Because Article I congressional-
executive agreements combine the making of the international agree-
ment with its domestic implementation, its enactment represents
something more akin to the sunk cost of political capital.
B. Choice of Instruments and Commitment
The choice of instruments may have far more to do with the sec-
ond obstacle to making international agreements. Even if nations
have successfully revealed private information and identified their bar-
gaining range, they will still have difficulty in making credible commit-
ments to keeping their agreement. Unlike the domestic contracting
setting, there is no supranational government that can compel nations
to keep their promises. This had led to some formal work on the
causes of war to conclude that states might fight even if they have
complete information, compounding the inefficiency puzzle of war. 10 6
Commitment problems will be especially pronounced in situations
with rapid changes in the balance of powers between the two states, or
where the division of the good itself will cause or accelerate shifts in
the distribution of power.
106 See, e.g., Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, supra note 79, at 194-95.
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The choice of instruments can play some role in providing what
the international system lacks. The Framers may have even been
aware of the problem, though they would not have thought of it in
modern terms. One of the chief problems with the Articles of Con-
federation was the inability of the Continental Congress to ensure
compliance with the 1783 Treaty that ended the Revolutionary
War.107 Congress itself had no power to legislate, tax, or spend, and
instead had to rely on the states to carry out its requests. It could only
ask the states politely to obey the 1783 Treaty. States refused. Several,
for example, refused to honor pre-Revolutionary War debts between
Americans borrowers and British lenders. This caused Britain to re-
fuse, as required under the treaty, to turn over territories and strategic
forts along the northwestern frontiers.' 08 Congress could not compel
states to lower trade barriers to live up to proposed trade agree-
ments.' 09 The Framers realized that the national government's failure
to enforce existing treaties would discourage other states from making
agreements with the United States in the future. Failure to live up to
past commitments would make it difficult to convince other nations,
in an international system characterized by anarchy, to believe any
promises.
Alexander Hamilton, writing as Publius in the Federalist Papers,
put the problem clearly: "The treaties of the United States, under the
present constitution, are liable to the infractions of thirteen different
Legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting
under the authority of those Legislatures."' 10 Ensuring that the
United States lived up to its international promises was challenging, to
say the least. "The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole
union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the pas-
sions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed.""'
Nations would have no credible belief that the United States could
commit. "Is it possible that foreign nations can either respect or con-
fide in such a government?"'"12
Domestic constitutional arrangements, some Framers realized,
might help overcome these commitment problems. This, in fact, was
one of the Framers' explanations for the two-thirds requirement for
107 The story of the problem in enforcing treaties during the "Critical Period" between
the Revolution and the Constitution is told in John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution:
Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 2013-24
(1999).
108 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 91 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
109 See FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 52-95 (1973).





the approval of treaties by the Senate. Responding to anti-federalists
critical of the inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause, John Jay
responded as Publius: "These gentlemen would do well to reflect that
a treaty is only another name for a bargain."' 1 3 Jay continued: "[I]t
would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain
with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but on us only so
long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it." 1 14 Jay
thought the commitment problem so serious that he suggested in Fed-
eralist No. 64 that the United States could neither withdraw from a
treaty without the permission of the other state nor terminate one by a
simple act of Congress. 115 Jay appeared to believe that terminating a
treaty would require both the President's decision and approval by
two-thirds of the Senate.
Reading the Constitution in this manner would have allowed the
national government to use its internal separation of powers to send
credible signals of commitment. In the context of war, political scien-
tists have pointed to public declarations by a President of ultimatums
or demands as credible signals because of the domestic political costs
if the President does not follow through.1 6 Here, the audience costs
go beyond mere threats and the attendant gains for the opposition. If
the President could not terminate a treaty under the rules of the do-
mestic Constitution without the approval of two-thirds of the Senate,
the use of the Article II process would be a powerful signal of commit-
ment. In this case, Article II's supermajority requirements would work
in the nation's favor. As little as 7.4% of the population could prevent
any effort by the United States to renege on its international promises.
While the two-thirds termination requirement could not permanently
guarantee a commitment to an agreement, it would significantly raise
the political price for a President intent on reneging.
Constitutional practice, however, did not develop in the direction
that Jay predicted. Within a decade of Federalist No. 64, the United
States terminated its first treaty. The United States withdrew from the
1778 Treaty of Alliance with France both unilaterally and by statute,
ruining both of Jay's commitment devices. The death knell for the
French treaty even occurred as early as the beginning of President
Washington's second term. Under attack by nations seeking to re-
store the Bourbon monarchy, the French called on the United States
to provide military assistance from 1792 to 1793.117 President Wash-
ington decided instead to interpret the 1778 Treaty as allowing the
113 THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 436-37 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
114 Id. at 437.
115 Id.
116 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
117 See Treaty of Alliance, U.S.-Fr., art. XI, Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 6 (calling upon the
United States to guarantee French possessions in America).
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nation to remain neutral in the fighting. 118 He did not consult Con-
gress or the Senate or seek its approval. Congress eventually termi-
nated the treaty, 119 at President Adams' request, and began an
undeclared naval war with France in 1798.
A credible signal might still be available if congressional consent
to termination continued as a constitutional requirement. Under cur-
rent population figures, 16% of the population-the smallest twenty-
five states-could still block an effort to terminate a treaty in the Sen-
ate, if not the House. But by the time of Abraham Lincoln, Presidents
had unilaterally withdrawn the nation from treaties without the con-
sent of either the Senate or Congress. 120 Today, the United States
terminates treaties sometimes by congressional act, but more often by
sole presidential decision. President George W. Bush, for example,
terminated the ABM Treaty in 2002 without seeking congressional ap-
proval. 12 1 As with the 1778 Treaty with France, presidential interpre-
tation of the ABM Treaty had already set the stage for its termination.
Beginning in 1984, Presidents from Reagan through Clinton inter-
preted the agreement to allow the United States to research and de-
velop ABM systems for eventual deployment on the West Coast.122
While the Presidents needed congressional cooperation to fund the
development of ABM technology, they never sought congressional ap-
proval for their reading of the treaty. 123
While members of Congress have opposed this practice at various
times, the courts have refused to intervene. The constitutional ques-
tion of presidential treaty termination did not reach the courts until
the United States withdrew from the mutual defense treaty with Tai-
wan in 1979. In Goldwater v. Carter, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit upheld the termination as part of the President's executive
118 See George Washington, A Proclamation (Apr. 22, 1793), in 1 A COMPiLATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 156 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1896).
119 See Act ofJuly 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578.
120 SeeJohn C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REv.
1305, 1320 n.94 (2002).
121 Remarks Announcing the United States Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1510, 1510 (Dec. 13, 2001).
122 See David Edward Grogan, Power Play: Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, National Ballistic
Defense and the ABM Treaty, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 799, 814 n.82 (1999) (describing how the
Reagan and Bush administrations took an expansive view of the interpretation of the
treaty, and the Clinton administration initially took a restrictive view); Brian T. Kennedy,
Mad vs. Missile Defense: How the ABM Treaty Undermines the Security of the United States and its
Allies 4 NEXUS 99, 106 (1999) (highlighting how the Clinton administration changed its
tune at the end of its administration and switched to the more expansive view of prior
Republican administrations).
123 See Yoo, supra note 33, at 858-64 (describing the Reagan administration's contro-




power in foreign affairs. 124 Comparing the issue to the President's
power to remove executive branch officials without congressional con-
sent, the court found that the two-thirds Senate approval requirement
was a narrow exception from the President's constitutional authority
and that it did not extend further to the power to end agreements. 125
The Supreme Court could not agree on a majority opinion. 126 Four
Justices found that the case presented a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion, Justice Powell found the case unripe because Congress as an in-
stitution had not taken any steps to thwart the President, and Justice
Brennan reached the merits and agreed with the D.C. Circuit.127 The
Court's refusal to intervene allowed President Carter's unilateral ter-
mination of the mutual defense treaty to take effect.
Article II treaties, therefore, may send a relatively credible signal
about the reliability of private information. But they send a less credi-
ble signal about the United States' future commitment to keeping its
promise to another nation. If the Constitution required the President
and Congress to agree to the withdrawal from an international agree-
ment, the political costs of reneging on the promise would be higher,
which would send a costly signal of commitment. Commitment does
not come from international enforcement of promises, but from rais-
ing the domestic costs for a President to implement his foreign policy.
A requirement of congressional or Senate consent would require the
President to expend political capital and take public positions that
would hurt his standing with the electorate if unfulfilled. In the politi-
cal science models discussed in Part II, the Constitution could have
raised the audience costs for any treaty termination, thereby allowing
a credible signal of commitment to be sent. But terminating a treaty
does not require the President to receive the consent of another coor-
dinate branch of government. By allowing unilateral presidential ter-
mination of treaties, constitutional practice has reduced their utility as
a credible signal of commitment.
Treaty termination, however, is not wholly costless. The domestic
cost realized by the President will come from the political process
rather than from the constitutional allocation of powers. This may be
high initially, but may well drop off in the future. Criticism of a Presi-
dent's decision to unilaterally terminate a treaty will likely come most
directly from the Senators who gave their advice and consent. But as
time passes, the holders of Senate seats may change and the new of-
ficeholders may have little to no attachment to treaties approved by
124 See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 703-09 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S.
996 (1979).
125 See id. at 703-04.
126 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
127 See id. at 1002-06 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.); id. at 997-98 (Powell, J.,
concurring); id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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their predecessors. Any political opposition to presidential termina-
tion will have more to do with the specific policies governed by the
treaty than any strong desire to keep commitments made by past Sen-
ates. These costs will be even smaller if the same political party both
controls the Presidency and holds a majority in Congress, which
would give the latter more political incentive to leave a termination
unchallenged.
Congressional-executive agreements, by contrast, may present the
opposite trade-off on signaling information versus commitment.
Adopting an international agreement by the Article I statutory route
sends a less credible signal about the reliability of revealed informa-
tion because of the lower number of votes required for approval. But
because of differences in terminating procedures, congressional-exec-
utive agreements may send a stronger signal than Article II treaties
about commitment. Unlike treaties, congressional-executive agree-
ments require legislative approval before termination because of their
different constitutional pathways.
Recall the constitutional difference between treaties and congres-
sional-executive agreements. Treaties are executive acts-hence the
location of the advice-and-consent clause in Article II alongside the
similar provision for the appointment of executive branch officers.
The location of the treaty power in Article II was an important piece
of evidence for the courts in Goldwater in agreeing that the President
could terminate treaties and that the courts had no authority to review
the decision.1 28 The constitutional argument for presidential termi-
nation of treaties mimics the argument for presidential removal of
subordinate officers. While the Senate must consent to the appoint-
ment of major officers of the government, the Constitution remains
silent about their removal. The Constitution has been understood to
grant removal to the President, except in certain circumstances, be-
cause the Senate's consent is a specific exception to what would have
been a general executive power to both appoint and remove unilater-
ally. Similarly, the Constitution is silent about treaty termination, but
the lower courts have read it as remaining with the President because
the Senate's advice-and-consent role is a specific exception to a gen-
eral executive authority to make or terminate treaties. 129
Congressional-executive agreements, by contrast, are statutes.
They are passed using the same process as other laws enacted within
Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers. They combine the approval of
128 See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 705.
129 Id.; see also Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2, 14, 18 (D.D.C. 2002) (applying
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Goldwater and concluding that the plaintiffs' chal-
lenge to President Bush's unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty without congres-
sional approval was a nonjusticiable political question).
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the international agreement with the necessary domestic implement-
ing legislation. As with removal or treaties, the Constitution only sets
out the process for the affirmative enactment of a statute. Article I
does not explicitly address the negative act of terminating the law.
Unlike removal or treaties, however, the Constitution has not been
understood to allow for alternate methods for reversing an earlier stat-
ute. If Congress or the President wants to terminate a federal law,
they must enact a second law overriding the first. One exception
might be judicial review, but a court's striking down of a federal law
conceptually amounts to no more than judicial refusal to enforce a
law, rather than the actual removal of the law from the U.S. Code.
Generally, statutes must be reversed by later-in-time statutes.
Hence, a President who wishes to withdraw from a congressional-
executive agreement must convince a majority of Congress to consent.
And the supermajority nature of enactment works against breaking
the international commitment. The President needs not only 51% of
the House, but also fifty-one Senators. If the twenty-five smallest states
oppose terminating the congressional-executive agreement, the Presi-
dent may need to persuade Senators who represent as much as 84% of
the population to consent. And, taking into account the Senate fili-
buster rule, the President may even need to win over Senators who
represent as much as 90% of the nation's population. That is not
quite the 93% needed for two-thirds of the Senate, but a high political
cost nonetheless.
The difference between treaty and statutory termination allows
the United States to send signals of varying credibility about its com-
mitment to keep an international promise. Treaties will send a lesser
signal of commitment than congressional-executive agreements be-
cause of the President's power to unilaterally terminate the former.
The President's main domestic cost will arise from opposition political
parties and interest groups that support the policies in the treaty. A
President would suffer those same costs in terminating a congres-
sional-executive agreement, but he must go to the greater effort of
assembling majorities in both the House and Senate. These audience
costs could be significant, especially if opposition aligns along differ-
ences in state geography or population. The additional political re-
sources required to terminate a statute provides a credible signal, at
the time of the signing of the international agreement, of
commitment.
This trade-off between treaties and congressional-executive agree-
ments may help explain some consistencies in U.S. practice. Some
scholars, such as Ackerman and Golove. insist that the instruments
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should be fully interchangeable, 130 and others, such as Hathaway, ar-
gue that they already are.1 31 These scholars claim that congressional-
executive agreements are easier to ratify and more justified as a matter
of democratic theory. Nevertheless, the United States has continued
to use treaties for significant political agreements, such as the Treaty
of Versailles, U.N. Charter, NATO, and the settlement of the Cold
War in Europe. It still chooses the Article II treaty form for arms-
control pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, SALT, the INF and START
agreements, the chemical weapons convention, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, and now the New START. If full interchangeability
were correct, Presidents should always use the Article I route, even for
political and arms-control agreements. In fact, if interchangeability
were correct, a President could take a treaty rejected by the Senate
(such as the Treaty of Versailles or the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty) and resubmit it for simple majority approval as a statute. This
appears to have never happened.
Supporters of interchangeability might claim that Presidents still
choose treaties because the Senate demands it. Senators who are con-
cerned about maintaining their institution's prerogatives could
threaten to block any international agreements that come through Ar-
ticle I, rather than Article II. The smallest states should have the
greatest interest in preserving the Senate's constitutional place. They
demanded the creation of the Senate as the price of the Constitu-
tion's creation and ensured that the Senate would have a veto over
any form of federal lawmaking.' 32 It would require the twenty-five
smallest states, which today represent 16% of the population, to band
together to block all congressional-executive agreements, so that a
mere 7% of the population through the one-third smallest states can
block any future treaty. Ackerman and Golove, however, claim that
the Senate gave up any effort to play defense in the wake of World
War II, when it allowed the IMF and Bretton Woods through as con-
gressional-executive agreements, rather than treaties. 133 Nor did any
defenders of the Senate's prerogatives appear when NAFTA-perhaps
the last international agreement to spur widespread public debate
(Vice President Gore publicly debated 1992 presidential candidate
Ross Perot on national radio and television over NAFTA's merits)-
went through Congress by simple majorities.134
130 See supra Part I.
131 See supra Part 1.
132 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 80 TEX. L. REv. 327, 330-31 (2001).
133 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
134 The Gore-Perot debate on NAFTA was hosted on CNN's "Larry King Live" show
on November 10, 1993. James Gerstenzang & Paul Richter, Gore, Perot Tangle in Heated
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The interchangeability puzzle is not really about why congres-
sional-executive agreements have not fully replaced treaties. It is
about why the United States continues to use Article II treaties, and in
fact reserves them for some of the most important international agree-
ments. Normative justifications rooted in democratic legitimacy or
constitutional interpretation cannot provide an answer. Instead, the
consequences of the choice of instrument hint at the solution. Trea-
ties strike a particular trade-off: they can reveal significant private in-
formation in a credible manner, but with a lower signal of
commitment. Congressional-executive agreements reveal private in-
formation less credibly, but they send a more costly signal of ex post
commitment. This may make treaties particularly effective for secur-
ity-related agreements such as arms-control or military alliances. In
these areas, information asymmetries may prove to be the more diffi-
cult obstacle to cooperation. A nation will start out with less access to
public information about the other side's military capabilities and re-
sources, particularly its probability of prevailing in any conflict (our P
variable). It will have serious concerns about bluffing, especially in
the presence of rapid shifts in the balance of power. A mistaken deci-
sion might result in the direst consequences: military defeat, reduced
territory, and loss of lives and resources (a high Vvariable).
In these circumstances, choosing the Article II process can help
overcome the serious credibility issues in revealing private informa-
tion. At the same time, credibility of commitment may not be as im-
portant. Nations may want to have an easier escape hatch for treaties
that involve vital national interests. With arms control, for example,
the United States may want to reveal to the Soviet Union that its an-
tiballistic missile program is fairly primitive and easily dismantled. But
it may also want to reserve the ability to pull out of the treaty fairly
quickly in the future because of a change in circumstances. That
change may have little to do with the Soviet Union and more to do
with a threat from another nation, such as North Korea, which might
develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capability and nuclear
weapons that could be deterred by a small-scale ABM system. The
United States, in fact, might expect the Soviet Union to terminate
quickly too, should its vital national interests come under threat.
Arms-control treaties explicitly recognize this fact by making provision
for unilateral withdrawal under such conditions. Article XV of the
ABM Treaty, for example, set out that "[e]ach Party shall, in exercis-
ing its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this




Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests."'1 35
Congressional-executive agreements, by contrast, would prove
better suited for situations where the United States has less need to
reveal private information and more need to show a credible commit-
ment. Economic agreements could fall into this category. As argued
earlier, there may be little private information that needs to be re-
vealed to reach an agreement. Commitment, however, may prove the
more difficult challenge. Trade agreements will encourage invest-
ments, such as in manufacturing plants or distribution and retail facil-
ities, to take advantage of reduced tariffs and other trade barriers.
Private actors, however, will have some reluctance to invest if they are
unsure about the long-term commitment of the United States to the
agreement. Making it more difficult for the President to terminate a
trade agreement will increase confidence that the United States will
comply with its obligations.
This explanation of the congressional-executive agreement draws
on the same intuition as rational choice explanations for the separa-
tion of powers. Some political scientists have argued that the separa-
tion of powers may have emerged in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century England as a way for monarchs to promise not to expropriate
the property of the upper classes.' 36 Without that commitment, the
Crown would have had difficulty convincing investors to lend it money
for foreign wars and domestic expenses. A parallel account describes
judicial independence as a valuable commitment device for govern-
ments that want to encourage private and foreign investment in their
economies. Judicial review vests an independent body with the power
to block an effort to nationalize investments. Congressional-executive
agreements similarly allow 51% of the House or a blocking minority
in the Senate to exercise a form of review over the President's deci-
sion to terminate an international pact.
A related point is worth making regarding the choice of instru-
ments. If treaties reveal information more credibly but show weaker
signals of commitment, and congressional-executive agreements re-
veal information less credibly but provide greater signals of commit-
ment, then two instruments remain missing: (1) a form of agreement
with less credible information transmission and weak signals of com-
mitment, and (2) a form with highly credible information transmis-
sion and strong signals of commitment. This would give the United
135 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XV,
May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435.
136 See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolu-




States a full range of instruments to tailor to information asymmetry
or enforcement difficulties.
It may come as a surprise that while practice has provided for
one, it has precluded the other. Sole executive agreements, which are
outside the scope of this Article, emerged alongside the congres-
sional-executive agreement in the New Deal and post-World War II
period as another means of reaching international agreements. 137
The President alone holds the power to make and terminate sole ex-
ecutive agreements without approval or implementation by Congress.
Like congressional-executive agreements, their constitutional place
has rested uneasily.138 They can be understood not just as a Presi-
dent's promise to use his singular constitutional powers to follow a
promised policy, but as a less credible signal of revealing information
that has the same commitment value as a treaty.
Still missing is an instrument that combines a high credibility of
information with strong commitment signals. On this point, perhaps
a treaty-exclusivist view may have had it right. There is no strong rea-
son to read the Constitution to require that two-thirds of the Senate
has to approve the termination of a treaty, though it would mirror the
formal symmetry for the making and ending of statutes. In fact, when
compared to the adjacent Appointments Clause, the natural reading
would be that the termination of a treaty, like the removal of an of-
ficer, falls within the President's executive power. This result coheres
with the overall practice and, I would argue, the original constitu-
tional design, in vesting the President with control over foreign policy.
Nevertheless, this reading of the Constitution removes from the na-
tion's tool chest an instrument that could send the most credible sig-
nals on information and commitment, and hence lead to the most
durable international agreements.
Non-self-execution of treaties, however, may have provided a level
of commitment that moves toward filling this gap. No constitutional
procedure currently approximates the informative and costly signal
transmitted by a two-thirds requirement for both making and termi-
nating a treaty. The only constitutional process that comes close is the
consent required for constitutional amendment of two-thirds of the
137 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 14-16 (Comm. Print 1993). While
these nontreaty numbers include both congressional-executive agreements and sole execu-
tive agreements, most of these agreements appear to have undergone approval by both
houses of Congress.
138 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REv.
1573, 1654-60 (2007) (disputing that the President may constitutionally make sole execu-
tive agreements with the force of federal law); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and
the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REv. 133, 218-35 (1998) (concluding that, under the origi-




Congress and three-quarters of the states, which is somewhat more
difficult. Non-self-execution, however, requires that certain treaties
not take effect domestically without implementing legislation. 13 9 As
with congressional-executive agreements, scholars dispute how broad
the doctrine reaches-some argue that it only includes treaties that
promise future action, while others believe it includes treaties that
regulate matters resting within Congress's Article I, Section 8 pow-
ers. 140 Regardless of the doctrine's breadth, most agree that the Sen-
ate can condition its approval of a treaty with a requirement that it not
take effect without further implementing legislation.1 4 '
Non-self-execution provides the political branches with an instru-
ment that comes close to filling the gap created by the executive's
unilateral termination of treaties. Non-self-executing treaties still re-
quire two-thirds of the Senate for approval, which preserves the advan-
tage over congressional-executive agreements for overcoming
situations of asymmetric information. At the same time, non-self-exe-
cuting treaties require Congress to enact regular legislation to live up
to the terms of the international obligation. As a formal matter, ter-
minating the treaty will not undo the accompanying implementing
statute unless Congress enacts a repealing law. This signals commit-
ment at the same level of intensity as a congressional-executive agree-
ment, and greater than for a normal treaty. Non-self-execution has
received harsh criticism from many international law scholars, despite
the Supreme Court's long and continuing application of the doctrine.
Ironically, these scholars criticize non-self-execution for making Amer-
ican compliance with international obligations suspect, 142 while miss-
ing its advantages in overcoming bargaining obstacles to making
agreements in the first place.
Treaties may have one last instrumental advantage over congres-
sional-executive agreements. Such advantage derives from Schelling's
insight that a rational actor, under certain circumstances, might want
to act irrationally so as to gain an advantage in conflict resolution.
"IT]he power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to
make concessions and to meet demands."143 Schelling further ob-
served that an executive negotiating a settlement with another nation
139 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008).
140 For different perspectives on non-self-execution, see Martin S. Flaherty, History
Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land,"
99 COLUM. L. Rzv. 2095, 2095 (1999) (self-execution); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Laughing at
Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2154 (1999) (self-execution); John C. Yoo, Treaties and
Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2218, 2233-57 (1999) (non-self-execution).
141 This stems from Chief Justice John Marshall's early recognition of non-self-execu-
tion in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307-16 (1829).
142 See Flaherty, supra note 140; Vazquez, supra note 140.
143 SCHELLING, supra note 78, at 19.
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would have more credibility in establishing a firm position if it is evi-
dent that he must seek approval from a legislature that will only ac-
cept a certain range of options. 144 This intuitively makes sense. If the
President can only agree to treaty terms that two-thirds of the Senate
will accept, the United States has committed itself to a limited range
of outcomes. As a device, it is similar to Cortez's decision to burn his
ships as a signal that he would not accept retreat as an option.
Scholars have since developed this conjecture into a theory. They
conclude that a bargaining advantage will accrue to a nation that must
seek ratification after an agreement is reached. 145 Even though the
domestic constraints narrow the executive's negotiating flexibility,
they send a credible signal that the President can only agree to certain
options and not others. Some of the scholarship shows that the
higher the domestic ratification constraints on the executive, the
more a nation will receive in bargaining advantage over a nation that
has no similar constraint.146 If both sides have high constraints, then
neither obtains a bargaining advantage.
Schelling's theory illustrates one way that treaties may prove supe-
rior to congressional-executive agreements in communicating credi-
bility-credibility of a different sort than discussed earlier. The two-
thirds majority of the Senate is one of the Constitution's highest pro-
cedural hurdles for federal action. It sends a costly signal to another
nation that the United States can only accept a certain range of inter-
national agreements. Its use gives the United States an advantage in
negotiating with a country that has no domestic constitutional ratifica-
tion requirements, or at least negates any advantage that a similar de-
mocracy might have enjoyed. Of course, congressional-executive
agreements would provide some of the same benefits, but treaties al-
low the United States to ratchet the constraints even higher. Follow-
ing an approach that uses only congressional-executive agreements
would force the nation to give up the potential bargaining advantages
from having a choice of instruments.
CONCLUSION
This Article explains the functional trade-offs between various
forms of international agreements under the Constitution. It shows
that, putting aside the arguments rooted in constitutional legitimacy,
a choice of instruments can provide advantages to American foreign
policymaking. It adopts a model that understands the primary obsta-
144 See id. at 27-28.
145 See, e.g., HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC
POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 68 (1997); Ahmer Tarar, International Bargaining
with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 320, 323-25 (2001).
146 See Tarar, supra note 145, at 329-30.
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cles to rational agreements between two states as asymmetric informa-
tion and signaling commitment. The choice between treaties and
congressional-executive agreements allows the United States to reveal
different levels of private information and signal varying levels of com-
mitment in the course of reaching a bargain.
The President and Congress could achieve the same ends by spec-
ifying a different level of approval in a congressional-executive agree-
ment itself. If, for example, the political branches wanted to reveal
more private information, on a par with a treaty, they could specify
that a congressional-executive agreement must receive 60%, 67%, or
even 75% approval in both houses. Congress has not yet attempted
something like this. Such a mechanism raises questions about
whether a current Congress can bind a future Congress. If a Congress
were to enact a congressional-executive agreement by a simple major-
ity and delete the higher vote requirement, it would have met the re-
quirements to become federal law. The United States' bargaining
partner might question the reliability of ad hoc vote requirements in
congressional-executive agreements that do not originate from the
Constitution itself. Adhering to the Constitution's vote requirements
for statutes and treaties may provide stronger indications about the
reliability of the signals sent by the United States.
These ideas reinforce the value of understanding in instrumental
terms the process of making international agreements. The contest
over whether treaties or statutes are the only valid form of reaching
international agreements has had little to no impact upon the politi-
cal orjudicial branches of the government. The United States contin-
ues to use both methods to make its international commitments. This
Article proceeds from the assumption that a useful, but little ex-
ploited, approach is to judge the consequences of the different ap-
proaches. More attention to the costs and benefits of treaties and
congressional-executive agreements allows us to not only better un-
derstand their use. It also helps identify the advantages to American
foreign policy of the choice of instruments.
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